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1 For some recent theoretical work regarding the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pricing games among singlecompetitors is the only difference between the pre-and post-merger industry structures, which can be easily handled with an adjustment to the ownership matrix entering the same FOCs, postmerger prices are solutions to a system of non-linear equations.
We quantify the variation in postmerger market outcomes from different demand estimates due to alternative starting value/algorithm combinations. We use the cereal data from Nevo (2000) and automobile data from Berry et al. (1995) . The hypothetical merger in the cereal industry involves Kellogg's and General Mills. The hypothetical merger in the automobile industry involves GM and Chrysler.
In the case of cereals, the difference between post-and pre-merger prices is between -0.05 cents per serving to about 19 cents. Post-merger industry profits are between $75 million and $5.8 billion. The change in consumer welfare also exhibits notable variation: -$182 million to $953 million. In the case of automobiles, the average change in price is between $28 and $187. Profits and consumer welfare also vary widely: $5 to $35 billion, and $219 million to $1.5 billion, respectively.
Our work should be of immediate interest to Antitrust agencies that routinely review a large number of mergers under very tight time constraints and frequently employ simulation techniques to assess their potentially anticompetitive effects.
2 product firms facing RC-Logit demand curves, see Allon, Federgruen and Pierson (2010) .
2 Since the introduction of the Hart-
In the next section, we discuss some details regarding the challenges in the estimation of a typical RC-Logit model. In Section II, we outline computational issues associated with the calculation of the post-merger prices in the Bertrand game. We present our findings in Section . Conclusions are presented in Section IV.
I. The Demand Model
The first step of the merger simulation exercise is the estimation of the underlying demand model. We refer the reader to Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000) for the details of the standard BLP-type model, as well as estimation strategies. Berry et al. (1995) establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimates and provide the associated variance-covariance matrix.
Following the publication of computer code by Nevo (2000) , the estimation of BLP-type models have become increasingly popular. More recently, studies, including some of our work, have identified issues with the computational aspects of this class of demand models that have been dominating the IO field for the last ten years or so. Following an HSR filing, the Agencies have 30 days to conduct their preliminary review and decide whether or not to issue a "second request" for a more thorough investigation of a potentially anticompetitive merger.
Before offering a brief overview of these studies, we should keep in mind that the objective function of a typical BLP model has not been shown to be globally concave (e.g., Bajari, Fox and Ryan (2007) ). A non-linear search in the parameter space usually requires hundreds or even thousands of function evaluations, with each of them involving a call of the contraction mapping introduced in Berry (1994) . Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) illustrate that the underlying GMM problem is a non-trivial one based on data from Nevo (2000) and BLP. Using more than 10 optimization algorithms from different classes (derivative-based, direct-search, random-search) and 50 starting values, they show that economic variables of interest, such as elasticities and consumer welfare, vary widely depending on the choice of optimization routine and starting value. Dube, Fox and Sun (2009) show that the temptation to implement loose stopping criteria for the contraction mapping to speed up the estimation process may cause two types of errors in parameter estimates. First, the approximation error of the inner contraction mapping propagates into the outer GMM objective function and its derivatives. Second, even when an optimization run converges, it may falsely stop at a point that is not a local minimum. The authors offer an alternative formulation of the GMM problem as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) building on work of Su and Judd (2008) .
II. The Bertrand Game
This section describes the second step of the merger simulation exercise assuming a Bertrand oligopoly model. Having retrieved marginal costs using the demand estimates and the FOCs of a Bertrand game, the researcher solves for the post-merger prices via simula-tion assuming existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium.
With demand estimates in hand, marginal costs are inferred using the FOCs of a static Bertrand model with multi-product firms:
where p is the price vector, s(·) is the vector of market shares, and mc denotes the corresponding marginal costs. The dimension of these vectors is equal to the number of the products available in the market, say J. The Ω matrix involves the share price-derivative matrix and an ownership structure matrix. The ownership structure matrix is of dimension J × J, with its (i, j) element equal to 1 if products i and j are produced by the same firm and zero, otherwise. Because prices are observed and demand estimation allows us to retrieve the elements of Ω, estimates of marginal costs, c mc, are directly obtained using (1).
A simple change of ones and zeros in the ownership structure matrix along with a series of additional assumptions (Nevo (2001) ) allows the simulation of a change in the industry's structure, as the one implied by mergers among competitors. Simply put, a merger simulation implies the same Bertrand equilibrium with a smaller number of firms. The vector of post-merger prices p post is the solution to the following system of nonlinear equations:
The elements ofΩ`p post´r eflect changes in the ownership structure implied by the hypothetical merger. Solving for the post-merger prices is equivalent to solving a system of nonlinear equations of dimension J in the market under consideration. For example, using the cereal data, we have 94 markets with 24 products in each market. As a result, solving (2) requires the solution of 94 systems of nonlinear equations of dimension 24.
In the results discussed below, we solve the system of nonlinear equations in (2) using a dogleg trust-region (DTR) version of Newton's method.
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We implement the DTR method via the MATLAB fsolve function using the premerger prices as starting values.
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III. Results
The results of our merger simulations for the cereal and the automobile industries appear in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. In both tables we report postmerger industry profits ("Profit"), total compensating variation ("CV"), and the average change in price ("Price") for 13 different algorithms we used to estimate the demand models in Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) .
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We used a set of 50 starting values for each of these 13 algorithms and solved for the post-merger prices using the set of starting values that gave rise to the minimum GMM objective function value. The demand specification for automobiles is similar, but not iden-3 Nocedal and Wright (1999) provide an excellent discussion of the method in their Chapter 11.
4 The termination tolerances for both the merit-function value and the vector of prices we are solving for are set equal to 1E-16. We also impose a maximum number of 1000 iterations. Additionally, the Jacobian is approximated using finite differences. The remaining of the fsolve settings are equal to their default values.
5 The total compensating variation (CV) in each market is equal to the product of the average compensating variation (ACV) with the potential market size. We calculate ACV averaging individual compensating variations calculated using equation (6) in Nevo (2001) . The price changes are weighted by pre-merger market shares.
tical, to Berry et al. (1995) .
6 Our demand model for cereals is identical to Nevo (2000) .
In the case of the cereal data, we report results for the market with the smallest share of the outside good.
7 For the automobile data, we report results for year 1990, which corresponds to the market with the largest potential size -approximately 94 million households. The post-merger industry profits are expressed in billions of dollars. The total compensating variation is measured in millions of dollars. The price changes are measured in cents per serving (cereals) and dollars (automobiles).
Depending on the algorithm used, in the case of cereals, the post-merger profits range between $75 million and $5.8 billion. The average change in price is between -0.05 cents and almost 19 cents per serving. The change in consumer welfare (CV) is as low as -$182 million and as high as $953 million.
Moving to automobiles, the postmerger profit range is between $5 billion and $35 billion when we exclude the outlier of $187 billion associated with the Genetic Algorithm (GENETALG). The change in consumer welfare (CV) is between $219 million and $1.5 billion. Finally, the average change in price is between $28 and $187.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we share our experience with merger simulations using a RC-Logit model on the demand side 6 For example, we don't allow for nonlinear income effects, and we use slightly different product characteristics. See Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) for the exact specification.
7 We assume a market size of 250 million as if the single market analyzed is representative of the nation. Although this assumption is somewhat arbitrary, it does not affect the variation in results discussed here. and assuming a static Bertrand game on the supply side. Drawing largely from our work in Knittel and Metaxoglou (2008) , we show that different demand estimates obtained from different combinations of optimization algorithms and starting values lead to substantial differences in post-merger market outcomes using metrics such as industry profits, and change in consumer welfare and prices. 
